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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 2014, Robby Shawn Stadnick and numerous others 
purchased shares of Vivint Solar—a solar energy company with a lucrative 
business model—helping it raise more than $300 million in proceeds.1  Any 
reasonable investor would have expected his or her newly purchased shares 
to, at minimum, hold their value over time, but, ideally, increase in value so 
as to turn a substantial profit.  This, however, was not the case for Stadnick 
and others who purchased the 20,600,000 shares of Vivint Solar’s common 
stock that first Wednesday in October 2014.2 
Much thought surrounds the valuation of shares in anticipation of a 
public offering.3  So when the price of Vivint Solar’s shares quickly dropped 
by more than 22%,4 a reasonable investor, such as Stadnick, would have 
justifiably been upset and concerned.  In anticipation of a public offering, a 
reasonable investor would presumably have read the issuer’s prospectus and 
registration statement, becoming intimately familiar with the issuer’s 
business model and financials, and confirming that the stock valuation was 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B., 2016, Georgetown 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Marina Lao for her invaluable guidance in writing 
this Comment.  I would also like to thank my family for their love and support in all of my 
endeavors.  
 1  Second Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities 
Laws at ¶ 1, Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., Nos. 14-cv-9283-KBF, 14-cv-9709-KBF 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015), 2015 WL 8492757 [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. 
 2  Id.  
 3  Shayndi Raice, The Art of the IPO, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:54 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203922804578080763596406112 (“It’s a 
fine line.  Price your shares too high, and you’ll collect a lot of money.  But the subsequent 
drop may alienate investors and demoralize your employees.  Price them too low and you’ll 
grab plenty of headlines as your stock soars on takeoff, but you’ve failed to raise nearly as 
much as you could have, and the initial buying frenzy may end up costing you some long-
term investors.”). 
 4  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
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reasonable and the shares were worth purchasing.5  Hence, a collective 
shareholder loss of $60 million is likely to shock an investor like Stadnick.6 
In the case of Vivint Solar, an investor such as Stadnick may not have 
predicted such a loss based on a normal reading of the prospectus and 
registration statement.  This is because the loss that Stadnick and other like-
investors suffered was the result of a conveniently timed public offering, 
taking place almost immediately prior to Vivint Solar’s release of its third 
quarter financial statements, which would show a dismal performance far 
greater than what a number of investors would have forecasted.7  An outcome 
of the sort that Stadnick and other Vivint Solar investors experienced begs 
the court for intervention.  Yet, for an issuing entity, it can be difficult to 
predict when it is necessary to disclose interim financial statements in 
anticipation of a public offering, as the circuits are split on what the 
appropriate test for making that determination is: the total mix test8 or the 
extreme departure test.9  This Comment will argue that the correct test courts 
should apply is the extreme departure test, expressed in Shaw v. Digital 
Equipment Corporation.10 
Both the total mix test and the extreme departure test are fairly 
straightforward and can be summarized somewhat simply.  The total mix test 
seeks to determine “whether there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted [interim financial statements] would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total 
mix” of information made available.’”11  The extreme departure test, on the 
other hand, asks whether the issuing entity was “in possession of nonpublic 
information indicating that the quarter in progress at the time of the public 
offering will be an extreme departure from the range of results which could 
be anticipated based on currently available information” in determining 
whether Section 11 liability is warranted due to the omission of interim 
financial statements within a prospectus, registration statement, etc.12 
This Comment will examine the peculiar and significant context of a 
public offering in determining whether courts considering Section 11 
 
 5  For an analysis on the reasonable investor and what is normally expected of him or 
her, see Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015). 
 6  Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
 7  Id. 
 8  The total mix test is commonly known as the materiality test.  Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, 
Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 9  Compare id. (applying the total mix test), with Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 
1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying the extreme departure test). 
 10  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 
 11  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37 (quoting DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
 12  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018). 
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liability should apply the total mix test or the extreme departure test for 
determining the materiality of omitting interim financial statements.  Part II 
of this Comment will provide the necessary background concerning Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933.13  Part III will present an overview of 
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation, 
and the two different materiality tests that were applied, creating a circuit 
split (the “Circuit Split”).  Part III will also argue that the extreme departure 
test should be the applicable test for determining materiality for purposes of 
Section 11 liability.  Part IV will examine the policy implications underlying 
both tests.  Part V will argue that, moving forward, circuits should apply the 
extreme departure test because it (1) best accommodates the expectations of 
actual, rather than reasonable, investors; (2) best fits with the existence of 
the insider trading disclose or abstain rule; and (3) best reconciles the need 
for a fiduciary duty in the context of insider trading with the nonexistence of 
such in a public offering.  Part V will also examine the remaining issues to 
be resolved in implementing the extreme departure test and concludes that 
the better test for circuits to apply remains the extreme departure test. 
II. INTRA-QUARTERLY DISCLOSURES, SECTION 11, AND THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933: WHEN IS DISCLOSURE REQUIRED? 
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”), which 
governs the initial offering of securities, with the primary objectives of (1) 
ensuring that potential investors receive significant information—financially 
and otherwise relevant—regarding the securities to be sold in a public 
offering; and (2) eliminating all forms of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation 
in connection with such offerings.14  To these ends, the ‘33 Act requires 
issuing entities to register their securities with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and also generally requires an issuer to disclose a 
description of its properties and business, the security to be offered, 
information concerning its management structure, and independently 
certified financial statements.15  As such, the registration requirement seeks 
to efficiently provide potential investors with a complete and accurate 
impression of the security to be offered.16 
 
 
 13  15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 14  The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining 
that the ‘33 Act, “[o]ften referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ law . . . has two basic 
objectives: [to] require that investors receive financial and other significant information 
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [to] prohibit deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities”). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
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Significantly, however, the SEC does not guarantee that the 
information that issuing entities provide in their registration statements is, in 
fact, accurate.17  Instead, the ‘33 Act provides investors with a private action 
to enforce Section 11 for material misrepresentations and omissions in the 
registration statement, among other things.18 
Under Section 11 of the ‘33 Act, issuing entities have a duty to disclose 
material information to potential investors in anticipation of a public 
offering.19  And they may be liable for registration statements containing “an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading.”20  An investor who bought shares—either at the time of a public 
offering, or on a secondary market and thereafter traceable to the public 
offering—may bring a civil suit against the issuing entity for violating 
Section 11 where that issuer omitted statements that would have been 
otherwise necessary to make the registration statement complete and not 
materially misleading.21 
Inherent in the federal securities laws, however, is the notion that 
silence on the part of an issuing entity cannot be actionable when the issuer 
has no duty to disclose.22  Significant to the issue analyzed herein is the fact 
that “the mere possession of material nonpublic information does not create 
a duty to disclose it.”23  The context of a public offering, however, creates “a 
strong affirmative duty of disclosure” on the part of the issuer,24 generating 
some confusion for an issuer regarding what exactly its obligations are. 
Issuing entities can turn to case law for some guidance as to the types 
of information that must be disclosed.25  As previously mentioned, though, 
silence where there is no duty to disclose is not actionable.26  But if an issuing 
entity does choose to disclose information though it has no legal duty to do 
so, the disclosure must be truthful and non-misleading.27 
 
 
 17  Id. 
 18  See id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 19  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Securities Act of 1933, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
[hereinafter LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE]. 
 22  Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 23  Id. (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 24  Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).  
 25  See J & R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (2018)); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); 
Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. 
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Section 11 liability often arises out of an issuing entity’s failure to 
disclose information required under Items 303 or 503 of Regulation S-K28: 
Item 303 requires issuing entities to provide forward-looking projections 
concerning any information that they possess;29 and Item 503 requires 
issuing entities to disclose the most significant factors that potentially render 
the offering risky.30 
Under Item 303, an issuer must disclose any information “that 
significantly or materially decreases the predictive value of [its] reported 
results.”31  An issuing entity’s internal forecasts are not considered to be 
material information giving rise to a duty to disclose.32  Such disclosure is 
not required because of the SEC’s apprehension that investors may 
misinterpret such information.33 
There are certain events, courts have noted, that would require an 
issuing entity to provide intra-quarter updates, however.34  “[M]aterial 
forward-looking information regarding known material trends and 
uncertainties [must] be disclosed as part of the required discussion of those 
matters and the analysis of their effects.”35  Courts consider statements or 
omissions material where a reasonable investor would have considered such 
information in making a significant investment decision.36  The exact test for 
materiality, as has been presented and will further be discussed in Part III, 
differs amongst circuits.37  A duty to disclose, however, arises when an 
 
 28  BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK §5:101 (2d ed. 2017). 
 29  J & R Mktg., SEP, 549 F.3d at 392 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1), (2)(ii), (3)(ii) 
(2018)). 
 30  City of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 426 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2018)). 
 31  Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002); see also 
Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1197–1203 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 32  In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 506–07 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir. 
1996) (“Plaintiffs’ nondisclosure claims fail because they base their allegations solely on 
discrepancies between actual (but undisclosed) intra-quarterly information and [the issuing 
entity’s] undisclosed internal projections.”); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., No. 96-1077-K, 
1996 WL 881659, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 1996) (“[Issuing entities] have no duty to disclose 
intraquarter results, even if those results are lower than the company’s internal projections.”). 
 33  In re Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citing In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 825 F. 
Supp. 623, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 34  Id. at 513 (citing In re Bank of Am. Sec. Corp. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 757 F. 
Supp. 2d 260, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Milman v. Box Hill Sys. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
 35  Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33–8350, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm.  
 36  See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232–33 (1988); Ganino v. Citizens 
Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 37  Compare Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2017), with Shaw v. Dig. 
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issuing entity’s financial predictions based on interim financial data “cease 
to be optional forecasts and instead become present knowledge.”38  Thus, the 
issue that interim financial statements pose to the inquiry discussed herein 
lies in the determination of whether they contain “material forward-looking 
information regarding known material trends or uncertainties.”39 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
This Part provides an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and 
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation, including the respective courts’ 
analysis of the relevant issues, including which test is to be applied in 
determining whether to invoke Section 11 liability.  To reiterate, the two tests 
may be summarized as follows: the total mix test looks at the information 
that a prospective investor had at hand in the wake of the public offering to 
determine whether the quarter-end results of the issuing entity would have 
been predictable by a reasonable investor given what information was made 
available to them;40 and the extreme departure test looks at the information 
that the issuing entity had at hand for the quarter in which the public offering 
took place, and seeks to determine whether that information would have 
indicated that the quarterly results would have been an extreme departure 
from prior predictions.41 
In light of the preceding discussion of the ‘33 Act and, particularly, 
Section 11 liability, it is relevant to turn once again to the narrative that 
opened this Comment.  As mentioned earlier, issuing entities consider many 
options in valuing their impending stock issuance,42 including the timing of 
the public offering.43 
 
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 38  Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Concept 
Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, 
Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 24, 1987) (“Both required 
disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends, events or uncertainties and 
optional forward-looking information may involve some prediction or projection.  The 
distinction between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required.  Required 
disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and uncertainties that are reasonably 
expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in the registrant’s product prices; 
erosion in the registrant’s market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely non-
renewal of a material contract.  In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves 
anticipating a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, 
trend or uncertainty.”). 
 39  In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (citation omitted). 
 40  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37. 
 41  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 
 42  See Raice, supra note 3. 
 43  For an overview of the factors and conditions that issuing entities take into account 
when determining when to publicly offer shares, see Simon Benninga et al., The Timing of 
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While most public offerings are strategically timed,44 the timing of 
Vivint Solar’s public offering was particularly deceptive.  Vivint Solar’s 
public offering took place on October 1, 2014, just one day after the end of 
its third quarter.45  As such, the quarter-end financial projections would have 
presumably been fairly concrete and only slightly speculative.46  On 
November 10, 2014, forty days after its public offering, Vivint Solar released 
its financial results for the third quarter: a decrease in the company’s net loss 
by $28.6 million.47  This information had not been provided to the potential 
investors prior to the public offering.48  Vivint Solar’s stock thereafter lost 
value; shares that had been sold at $16 per share at the public offering 
dropped to $11.70 per share just forty-three days later.49 
A similar situation occurred twenty-one years earlier when investors 
purchased the debt and equity securities of Digital Equipment Corporation.50  
In that case, Digital Equipment Corporation scheduled its public offering to 
begin just eleven days before the end of its third quarter and to close four 
days before the end of its third quarter.51  Just three weeks later, Digital 
Equipment Corporation released its financial statements for the third quarter, 
demonstrating its largest loss in over seven fiscal quarters.52  On that same 
day, its common stock value fell from $28.875 to $21.125.53 
While the course of events in Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and in Shaw 
v. Digital Equipment Corporation were uncannily similar, the courts in the 
two jurisdictions applied different tests to determine whether the respective 
quarter-to-date financial information were material, and thus their omission 
from the registration statement actionable.54  The Second Circuit in Stadnick 
split with the First Circuit in Shaw on the issue of whether a failure to 
disclose interim financial statements may be a material omission giving rise 
 
Initial Public Offerings, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (2005) (analyzing “the optimal conditions for 
taking a company public”).  
 44  Tom Farley, The Right Time to IPO, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/article/right-time-
to-ipo (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).  
 45  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.  
 46  See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
 47  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. at 34–35. 
 50  Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 51  Id. at 1200. 
 52  Id. (“[O]n April 15, 1994, [Digital Equipment Corporation] announced an operating 
loss of over $183 million for the quarter that had ended on April 2, 1994.  This third quarter 
loss was far greater than analysts had been expecting, and the largest that the company had 
reported since the first quarter of fiscal 1993.”).  
 53  Id. 
 54  Compare Stadnick, 861 F.3d 31 (applying the total mix test), with Shaw, 82 F.3d 1194 
(applying the extreme departure test). 
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to Section 11 liability.55 
A. Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp. 
1. Factual Background 
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation involved an action brought by 
preferred and common shareholders against Digital Equipment Corporation, 
its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and seven 
underwriting and investment banking firms.56  The plaintiffs sued the 
defendants under Sections 11 and 12(2) of the ‘33 Act.57  With respect to 
their Section 11 claims,58 plaintiffs asserted that Digital Equipment 
Corporation’s management was aware and in possession of material facts 
relating to large-scale losses to be reported in its third quarter of fiscal year 
1994, which the plaintiffs argued created a duty to disclose in connection 
with the public offering.59  Defendants responded by equating plaintiffs’ 
argument to an assertion that the issuer was required to release internal 
forecasts concerning the third quarter, and argued that such a claim was 
“untenable because the securities laws impose no duty upon a[n] [issuing 
entity] to disclose internal projections, estimates of quarterly results, or other 
forward-looking information.”60 
At the time, Digital Equipment Corporation was one of the largest 
computer hardware, software, and services suppliers in the world.61  Having 
gone public in 1966, by the early 1990’s it was earning roughly $14 billion 
per year in revenue.62  In 1992, however, Digital Equipment Corporation 
suffered quarterly losses of $138.3 million in January alone and between 
$30–311 million in the succeeding months.63  The company underwent a 
massive overhaul of its operating and management structure, cutting 35,000 
jobs and replacing its CEO,64 and, as a result, incurred restructuring charges 
of approximately $3.2 billion for the years 1990–1992.65  Notably, the 
company introduced a new, revolutionary product that jumpstarted its 
 
 55  B. Colby Hamilton, Second Circuit Splits with First Over Securities Disclosure Test, 
N.Y.L.J. (June 21, 2017, 3:58 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/120279 
0829271/.  
 56  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201.  
 57  Id.  
 58  This factual overview and analysis of the court’s reasoning is limited to a review of 
the Section 11 claim only, as that is what is pertinent to the argument made herein.  
 59  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201.  
 60  Id. at 1202.  
 61  Id. at 1199. 
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1199. 
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financial growth in February 1992.66  It finally had a profitable quarter in 
mid-1993, announcing a net profit of $113.2 million.67  This success was 
unsustainable, as the company reported a loss of $72 million for the second 
quarter of 1994.68 
Digital Equipment Corporation thereafter filed a shelf registration with 
the SEC, providing the company with the option of issuing a maximum of 
$1 billion in various debt classes and equity securities.69  The company began 
issuing stock on March 21, 1994, and ended its sale on March 28, 1994, four 
days prior to the end of its third quarter.70  At an offering price of $25 per 
share, the sale of the entirety of Digital Equipment Corporation’s depositary 
shares of preferred stock resulted in $387.4 million in proceeds for the 
company.71 
Digital Equipment Corporation announced its third quarter earnings 
less than three weeks after the close of its public offering.72  The reported 
loss was far greater than analysts’ expectations and was, in fact, its largest 
reported loss since fiscal year 1993’s first quarter.73  This announcement sent 
preferred stock prices plummeting from the offering price of $25 per share 
to $20.875 on April 15, and common stock prices plummeting from a high 
of $28.875 to $21.125 by the next trading day.74 
2. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation, the First Circuit analyzed 
whether Digital Equipment Corporation was legally obligated to disclose, in 
the registration statement, the imminent report of third quarter losses to 
investors.75  In sum, the First Circuit was uncertain as to the materiality of 
the information that Digital Equipment Corporation had in its possession at 
the time of the offering.76  Rather, it was unable to hold that Digital 
Equipment Corporation “was not required to disclose material information 
concerning its” third quarter interim financial statements.77  Ultimately, the 
First Circuit chose to apply the extreme departure test to the above-
mentioned facts to determine materiality because “it [was] consistent with 
 
 66  Id. at 1200. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 1202. 
 76  Id. at 1203. 
 77  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203.  
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the basic statutory policies favoring disclosure to require inclusion of that 
information in the registration statement.”78  These statutory policies will 
now be discussed. 
i. Insider Trading 
In its analysis, the First Circuit began by undertaking an insider trading 
analysis to compare the requirements of disclosure for an individual 
corporate insider in an insider trading case to the requirements for a 
corporation on the brink of a public offering.79  The court “conceptualiz[ed] 
[Digital Equipment Corporation] (the corporate issuer) as an individual 
insider transacting in the company’s securities, and . . . examine[d] the 
disclosure obligations that would then arise.”80  The court noted that the 
“disclose or abstain” rule, frequently applied to insider trading by 
individuals, is also applicable to an issuing entity trading in its own 
securities.81  The court expanded on this notion by positing that a rule 
comparable to disclose-or-abstain should be applicable to an issuing entity 
engaged in the public offering of its own shares.82  Otherwise, the court 
noted, “a corporate issuer selling its own securities would be left free to 
exploit its informational trading advantage, at the expense of investors, by 
delaying disclosure of material nonpublic negative news until after 
completion of the offering.”83 
ii. Section 11 and SEC Policy 
The court then conducted a policy analysis regarding whether strong 
disclosure requirements, such as those that exist in the context of an 
individual corporate insider in an insider trading case, should also exist in 
the context of corporate issuers.84  The civil liability imposed by Section 11 
ensures that issuing entities put forth full and complete effort in preparing 
their registration statements and ensuring that all required material 
 
 78  Id. at 1210. 
 79  Id. at 1203. 
 80  Id.  The First Circuit provided several justifications for analogizing individual insider 
trading and corporate insider trading.  Id.  For more information concerning the court’s 
analysis, see LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION, ch. 9, 
§ B.4 (5th ed. 2013) (“When the issuer itself wants to buy or sell its own securities, it has a 
choice: desist or disclose.”); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:6 (2018) (“Issuers themselves may buy or sell their own 
securities, and have long been held to an obligation of full disclosure . . . .  Conceptually, 
extending the insider trading prohibition to instances of issuer insider trading makes perfect 
sense.”). 
 81  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203. 
 82  Id. at 1204. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
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information is contained therein.85  Particular to Shaw is the fact that Digital 
Equipment Corporation prepared its public offering pursuant to SEC Form 
S-3, which requires that the prospectus describe: 
any and all material changes in the registrant’s affairs which have 
occurred since the end of the latest fiscal year for which certified 
financial statements were included in the latest annual report to 
security holders and which have not been described in a report on 
Form 10-Q or Form 8-K filed under the Exchange Act.86 
The court noted that the entire point of the requirement of disclosing material 
changes under Item 11(a) is to ensure that any and all necessary updates to 
the information were provided to the original SEC filings and the prospectus, 
even those concerning “‘known trends and uncertainties’ with respect to ‘net 
sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.’”87  Given the 
amount of information and the nature of such information that Digital 
Equipment Corporation had at hand during the days leading up to the end of 
its third quarter,88 it would have likely realized that this information would 
have indicated a financial performance departing from any predictions, or, at 
least, provided the company with some uncertainty as to its financial state. 
While Item 11(a) carries with it rather specific requirements, the 
general scheme of the federal securities laws also provides justification for 
utilizing the extreme departure test.89  The court noted that one of the primary 
goals of the securities laws is to uphold the principles of fairness and 
efficiency in the market.90  Coupled with the principles of fairness and 
efficiency is the notion that the market must be able to correctly align a 
stock’s price with its “fundamental value.”91  The court noted that the need 
for such reliable, firm-specific information is particularly strong within the 
context of public offerings, where prospective investors must rely solely on 
 
 85  Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018); LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 21. 
 86  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1205 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Instructions to Form S-3, Item 
11(a)).  Note that those entities filing Form S-3 prior to public offerings are of the sort not 
required to file more broadly available forms, such as S-1 or S-K, and are therefore not 
required to include in its prospectus the information required under Item 303: the disclosure 
of “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects 
will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from 
continuing operations.”  Id. at 1205 n.9 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018)). 
 87  Id. at 1205 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)). 
 88  See id. at 1200. 
 89  Id. at 1207 (“Together, the Acts embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
171 (1994))). 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. at 1207–08 (citing Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 988–89 (1992)). 
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what is presented to them by the issuing entity, including stock price.92 
In conclusion, the court noted that, although an issuing entity may have 
fully complied with the periodic disclosure requirements of the ‘33 Act, there 
remains the possibility that other, undisclosed facts may be material and, 
therefore, would have mandated disclosure.93  While the court did reject the 
notion that an issuing entity must disclose certain facts in every situation in 
which its quarterly results may possibly be subpar and disappoint the 
market,94 it held that potential investors deserve to have the most relevant 
and up-to-date information available to them before making an investment 
decision.95  In the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, the court 
concluded that its third quarter results presented “more than a minor business 
fluctuation . . . indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would 
turn out to be an extreme departure from publicly known trends and 
uncertainties.”96 
B. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. 
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. involved claims brought by stockholders 
who purchased stock of Vivint Solar, Inc. during its initial public offering 
(IPO), in which the plaintiffs alleged violation of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 
15 of the ‘33 Act.97  Relying on Shaw, the plaintiffs argued that Vivint Solar 
was required to disclose its interim financial statements for its third quarter, 
ending one day prior to its IPO, because it reflected an extreme departure 
from what was previously disclosed in the registration statement.98 
1. Factual Background 
Vivint Solar is a residential solar energy system company that, at the 
time of its IPO, was the second largest residential solar energy installer in 
the United States, possessing an 8% market share in 2013 and a 9% market 
share in 2014.99  Vivint Solar, significantly, operates on a unique business 
model, which is predicated on the continued ownership of the solar energy 
systems that it installs.100  This business model allows Vivint Solar to benefit 
from various tax credits and government incentives, which allows 
“[c]ustomers [to] pay no up-front costs and instead enter into twenty-year 
 
 92  Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1208 (citing Kahan, supra note 91, at 1014–15). 
 93  Id. at 1210. 
 94  Id.  
 95  See id.  
 96  Id. at 1211.  
 97  Stadnick v. Vivant Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).  
 98  Id. at 33. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. 
FATA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  12:12 PM 
2019] COMMENT 937 
leases by which they purchase solar energy in monthly payments at 
approximately 15% to 30% less than they would pay for utility-generated 
electricity.”101  Thus, Vivint Solar’s monthly revenue is generated primarily 
by these customer payments.102 
Due to its business structure, Vivint Solar naturally incurs major up-
front costs.103  Consequently, Vivint Solar has perpetually operated at a 
loss.104  To account for this, Vivint Solar uses an accounting system called 
Hypothetical Liquidation at Book Value (HLBV), which means that a 
shareholder’s ownership in the company is valued according to the balance 
sheet’s asset valuation for the company.105  Thus, the court noted that: 
Due to Vivint[] [Solar’s] business model and the HLBV method, 
the allocation of income (a net loss in each quarter during the 
relevant period) between shareholders and [outside investors] may 
vary substantially from one quarter to the next depending upon (1) 
contributions by investors and (2) transfers of title to the funds that 
provided the requisite capital.106 
Hence, when presented with the information concerning Vivint Solar’s 
business model and accounting method, a prospective investor would have 
had to attempt to make sense of this complicated mix of factors to predict 
the success of Vivint Solar in the event that they choose to become 
stockholders.  Indeed, this would have been an arduous task for any investor 
that is not an institution. 
In anticipation of its IPO on October 1, 2014, Vivint Solar, in 
accordance with SEC regulations, issued a registration statement that 
included its financial statements for the preceding six quarters.107  The 
Second Circuit noted that the registration statement would have indicated 
overarching fluctuating net losses, and even warned prospective investors of 
the potential impact its business and accounting models could have on the 
company’s income allocation amongst shareholders and outside investors.108  
Despite these warnings, Vivint Solar sold 20.6 million shares of common 
stock during its IPO, raising a total of $300.8 million in net proceeds.109 
Stockholder turmoil, however, began forty days later when Vivint Solar 
released its third quarter financial statements, indicating that outside 
investor-attributable net loss decreased by $28.6 million, substantially 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 33. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 34. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
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contributing to the decreased shareholder net income: a $40.8 million 
decrease, to be exact.110  Accordingly, earnings per share fell to negative 
$0.45, missing the mark of analysts’ projections by 143%.111  This naturally 
caused a decrease in Vivint Solar’s stock price, which ultimately fell by 
22.5% to $11.42 per share.112 
2. The Court’s Reasoning 
The court began by analyzing what the applicable test for determining 
the materiality of omitted interim financial information should be in the 
Second Circuit.113  It concluded that it should be the total mix test, based on 
DeMaria v. Andersen, decided by the Second Circuit in 2003.114  The 
following subsection analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in DeMaria, 
which adopted and set forth the total mix test.115 
DeMaria v. Andersen concerned facts highly similar to those of Shaw 
and Stadnick.  In DeMaria, plaintiffs argued that the issuing entity, ILife, 
failed to include in its registration statement financial information for its first 
quarter, which ended at the end of March, the same month in which ILife 
filed its registration statement with the SEC.116  In arriving at its conclusion, 
the Second Circuit compared the situation in DeMaria to a case in which an 
issuing entity’s disclosure consists of “both accurate and inaccurate 
information.”117  In essence, a registration statement that does not include 
interim financial information is, in fact, both accurate and inaccurate.  It is 
accurate in the sense that it provides all of the publicly available relevant 
financial information that it was required to disclose under SEC regulations, 
but, at the same time, it is inaccurate because other information exists and is 
known to the issuer that would change the results of the public information 
disclosed in the registration statement.  The Second Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in cautioning that “not every mixture with the 
true will neutralize the deceptive.  If it would take a financial analyst to spot 
the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will 
remain materially so, and liability should follow.”118 
Following that line of reasoning, the Second Circuit chose to utilize the 
test outlined by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
 
 110  Id. at 34–35. 
 111  Id. at 35. 
 112  Id. 
 113  See id. at 36. 
 114  Id. (citing DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 115  See generally DeMaria, 318 F.3d 170. 
 116  Id. at 172. 
 117  Id. at 179. 
 118  Id. (quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991)). 
FATA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  12:12 PM 
2019] COMMENT 939 
Inc.—the total mix test.119  In TSC, however, the Court was not addressing 
an alleged Section 11 violation.120  Rather, the Court was presented with an 
alleged violation of Section 14(a) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“‘34 Act”).121  As will be discussed at the end of this section, this 
comparison is not particularly sound.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit 
applied the total mix test in DeMaria because the Supreme Court had used 
the test to determine the materiality of omitted information—although not 
necessarily in the same context—in TSC.122 
3. Returning to the Court’s Reasoning in Stadnick 
The Second Circuit, in Stadnick applied the same—and, as will be 
argued, flawed—reasoning for applying the total mix test, stating that 
“DeMaria rests upon the classic materiality standard in the omission 
context[] with which [the court] and most other courts are familiar.”123  In 
further explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the extreme departure 
test applied in Shaw was too volatile and left too many questions open—i.e., 
metrics, the role of the reasonable investor, etc.—in determining whether an 
extreme departure had taken place.124  This argument will be discussed 
further in Parts IV and V. 
In the case of Vivint Solar, however, the Second Circuit concluded that 
the company’s registration statement included ample warnings for a 
prospective investor to conclude that such a result was possible.125  The court 
was also not convinced that a reasonable investor would have considered the 
omission material where such reasonable investor was privy to the 
 
 119  Id. at 180.  See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 120  See TSC, 426 U.S. at 441. 
 121  Id.  The ‘34 Act concerns empowering the SEC with broad regulatory powers over the 
entirety of the securities industry.  The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 
14.  In providing so, the ‘34 Act “also empowers the SEC to require periodic reporting of 
information by companies with publicly traded securities.”  Id. 
 122  See TSC, 426 U.S. at 441, 449.  It is necessary to note the analogy that the Second 
Circuit found in TSC, causing it to apply the total mix test.  This analogy comes, in large part, 
from the language of Section 14(a) of the ‘34 Act, which states that proxy solicitations should 
not be “false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or . . . omit[] to state any material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.”  Id. at 443 n.6 
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018)).  Assumedly, the Second Circuit relied on this 
language in applying the total mix test to the facts in DeMaria.  See DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 
180. 
 123  Stadnick v. Vivant Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2017).  
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 39 (“Vivint’s registration statement contained ample warnings and disclosures 
that explained shareholder revenue and earning fluctuations, namely that: (1) the peculiarities 
of its business model and the HLBV method render the metrics identified by Stadnick less 
probative of Vivint’s performance; (2) as a result, the income available for shareholders would 
likely fluctuate from quarter to quarter; and (3) Vivint anticipated its substantial operating 
losses to continue.”). 
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information concerning Vivint Solar’s peculiar business model and 
accounting method.126 
C. Summarizing the Split 
In choosing to apply the total mix test, the Second Circuit turned to the 
Supreme Court’s use of the test in the context of omissions.127  The notable 
difference between the cases that DeMaria cites to in support of its adoption 
of the total mix test, however, is that they are factually dissimilar to 
DeMaria, and to Shaw and Stadnick.128  The cited cases involved violations 
of the ‘34 Act,129 whereas DeMaria and Stadnick alleged violations of the 
‘33 Act.130  The position of the plaintiffs in the ‘34 Act cases131 and the 
position of the plaintiffs in the ‘33 Act cases132 are significantly different, 
especially when considering the sentiments underlying corporate law theory. 
The very dynamic of a publicly traded corporation underlines why 
shareholders deserve the most relevant information when deciding on 
whether to invest in a particular company.  Unless a shareholder owns shares 
in a closely-held corporation, his or her management role is slim.133  
Individually, a shareholder has an even less significant role in the 
corporation.134  Notably, a shareholder has no vote on matters that are 
fundamental to the company’s success, i.e., deciding on whether to issue 
 
 126  Id. 
 127  See id. at 37.  See generally TSC, 426 U.S. at 449; DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 178–79. 
 128  DeMaria cites the following cases in support of employing the total mix test: TSC, 426 
U.S. 438; Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000); In re IBM Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998).  DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 180.  
 129  See generally TSC, 426 U.S. at 439 (“A minority stockholder in an acquired 
corporation brought suit against the acquiring corporation and sellers of controlling interest 
in the acquired corporation, charging violation of the ‘34 Act and rules promulgated 
thereunder in regard to a joint proxy statement issued by the acquiring and acquired 
corporations.”); Press, 218 F.3d at 121 (“Investors brought suits alleging that broker-dealers 
defrauded them by failing to disclose receipt of fees from money market funds that firms 
selected for ‘automatic sweeps’ of plaintiffs’ uninvested funds.”); In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 
954 F. Supp. 81, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Stock purchasers brought class action securities fraud 
suit against corporation, alleging that corporation made false or misleading statements 
regarding its ability to continue paying quarterly dividend in present amount.”).  
 130  DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 172; Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 35.  
 131  The “‘34 Act cases” refers to TSC, Press, and In re IBM.  
 132  The “Section 11 cases” refers to Shaw, Stadnick, and DeMaria. 
 133  See WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL 
APPROACH 375–76 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that shareholders are only entitled to a vote on “(1) 
election and removal of directors, (2) amendments to the corporation’s charter, (3) 
shareholder (as opposed to board) initiated amendments to the corporation’s bylaws, (4) 
dissolution of the corporation, (5) a merger of the corporation, and (6) a sale of all (or 
substantially all) of the corporation’s assets” although the board may delegate other voting 
powers to the shareholders in its charter or bylaws).  
 134  See id. at 378 (explaining that votes are often tied to shares and not shareholders). 
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more stock, deciding on whether to relocate the company’s operations, 
deciding on whether its CEO should be replaced, and deciding on most other 
day-to-day operations of the company.135  In that regard, holding a 
company’s omissions to a lower standard with respect to shareholder 
disclosure claims makes sense, as it is in line with the understood, and well-
established corporate management scheme.  Holding omissions to a lower 
standard in Section 11 cases where potential investors are involved is 
concerning, however, because of the limited decision-making role that they 
would have as actual shareholders if they did, in fact, choose to purchase 
shares.  Hence, deciding on whether to invest in a particular company is an 
important decision that potential investors must make, as they are essentially 
placing their trust in that company to make the best business decisions and 
to operate in an efficient and profitable manner. 
There is also informs the fundamental difference in actions arising 
under the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act.  The ‘34 Act governs after an investor has 
already made the decision to invest in a company.136  The investor has 
already been convinced that he or she is investing in a good company and 
has already placed his or her trust in the company’s management.  At this 
time, after an investor has become a shareholder, fiduciary duties come into 
play.137  Thus, a shareholder has recourse against director action that 
potentially was not in the best interest of the company.138  These fiduciary 
duties, including the duty to disclose, are not present when there is no 
relationship between a company and its prospective investors.139  Thus, it is 
even more important for a higher standard to be applied in the omission 
context where an issuing entity is not bound by any fiduciary duties and an 
investor, therefore, generally has no recourse other than through the civil 
liability provisions under the ‘33 Act, i.e., Section 11.140 
 
 135  Id. at 376, 385; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 136  See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 14. 
 137  SJOSTROM, JR., supra note 133, at 429 (“[C]orporate law imposes two broad fiduciary 
duties on directors: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.”). 
 138  Although most director decisions are subject to the business judgment rule, this rule 
presumes that the action that potentially violated a fiduciary duty was an informed action that 
was done in good faith and in the honest belief that such action was, in fact, in the best interests 
of the company.  Id. at 430. 
 139  See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[T]he duty to disclose arises when 
one party has information ‘that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.’” (citation omitted)). 
 140  See generally Murray L. Simpson, Investors’ Civil Remedies Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (1962).  The main advantage of bringing a Section 
11 claim is that “the plaintiff can sue under this section without having to prove that the 
misrepresentation was addressed or intended to influence him. The cause of action runs in 
favor of all innocent buyers, thus eliminating the requirement of ‘privity’ of the parties.”  Id. 
at 72.  Additionally, there exists no “requirement of proof that the plaintiff ‘relied’ on the 
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Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Second Circuit, first in 
DeMaria and later in Stadnick, incorrectly ignored the unique context in 
which Section 11 claims are brought as compared to the context in which the 
total mix test has historically been used—that being in cases arising under 
the ‘34 Act.  In light of the lack of fiduciary duties present at the time of a 
public offering, a higher standard for evaluating the materiality of omissions 
must be used.  As will be subsequently discussed, the extreme departure test 
represents that higher standard. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Part presents the policy implications supporting the use of the 
extreme departure test for omissions in the public offering context.  As 
discussed infra in Part III, the lack of fiduciary duties and the importance of 
the public offering render it necessary to employ a higher standard in 
evaluating the materiality of omissions.  This must be reconciled with well-
established law that “[a] duty to disclose ‘does not arise from the mere 
possession of nonpublic market information.’”141  Thus, this Part seeks to 
reconcile the lack of fiduciary duties, particularly the lack of a duty to 
disclose, with the implementation of a higher materiality standard for 
omissions in the context of public offerings. 
A. The Insider Trader vs. The Institutional Trader 
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States, endorsed the notion 
of the disclose or abstain rule, which would require corporate insiders to 
“disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position 
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if 
known, would affect their investment judgment.”142  Issuing entities may be 
considered insider traders, too.143  How is it, then, that an issuing entity in 
 
registration statement.”  Id. 
 141  Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Chiarella, 445 
U.S. at 235). 
 142  In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the derivative of the disclose or abstain rule from this case.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–30.  
 143  See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities 
Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 
1178 (1999).  Insider trading liability for companies, however, concerns a company buying 
or selling its own shares and repurchasing its own securities.  Id.  As such, it would not apply 
in the context of Shaw or Stadnick.  Id. at 1178 n.240; see also McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 
Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[An issuing entity] in possession of material nonpublic 
information, must, like other insiders in the same situation, disclose that information to its 
shareholders or refrain from trading with them.” (citations omitted)); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 
Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434–39 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating a corporation’s duty to disclose a 
merger to an employee cashing in his shares); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th 
Cir. 1963) (holding that the duty to disclose material nonpublic information “appl[ies] not 
only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally to 
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possession of interim financial data that may sway potential investors’ 
opinions of its company is not held to the same abstain or disclose rule when 
it is on the brink of a public offering? 
Marcel Kahan argues that the disclose or abstain rule, along with other 
disclosure requirements, may promote the release of a greater quantity of 
information and more reliable information.144  This would, in turn, facilitate 
a more accurate assessment of stock prices that more closely relate to the 
stock’s fundamental value.145  In effect, the extreme departure test is an 
extension of the disclose or abstain rule—it promotes essentially the same 
thing: either disclose where the need to do so is vague or abstain from issuing 
shares until that information has been timely released to the public. 
While imposing the disclose or abstain rule on issuing entities is 
virtually impossible due to the lack of a fiduciary relationship between the 
issuing entity and the prospective investor,146 the public offering market 
should be a level playing field, just as the corporate repurchasing market 
is.147  The extreme departure test proposes a legitimate and viable solution to 
this issue.  The test would not, in effect, pressure issuing entities to disclose 
all, or even a large portion of the interim information—financial or 
otherwise—to prospective investors.  Rather, issuing entities would be 
forced to disclose any interim information in their possession that would 
present an extreme departure from any known trends or uncertainties.  By 
definition, “extreme” signifies that the information would have to be “of 
[the] character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary.”148  Thus, 
information that would indicate a slight stray from known trends or 
uncertainties—i.e., normal business fluctuations—would not meet this 
 
corporations themselves”); Green v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the prohibition against ‘insider’ trading extends to a 
corporation.”).  
 144  Kahan, supra note 91, at 985. 
 145  Id. 
 146  See generally Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming 
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 723 (1998) (“In sum, 
although the insider-trading analogy suggests that there should be a duty to disclose material 
negative information as to interim operational results, it is unclear whether such an extension 
could fit within the existing structure of insider-trading law with its requirement that there be 
a breach of fiduciary duty (or a similar relationship of trust and confidence).  Further, to 
recognize a fiduciary duty-based duty to disclose running from corporations to prospective 
shareholders would, in effect, produce a duty to disclose all material information in an 
offering because the nondisclosure of any material information would give rise to a claim that 
the company traded on material nonpublic information.  Such an expansion of the duty to 
disclose would, to a considerable extent, nullify the specific offering-based disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.”). 
 147  Note that the disclose or abstain rule applies to a company when it is buying or selling 
its own shares or participating in securities repurchasing programs.  Nagy, supra note 143.   
 148  Extreme, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/extreme (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2019). 
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standard for materiality and may be omitted without incurring liability.  Only 
information that is significantly beyond what would be expected would rise 
to the “extreme departure” level.  Thus, uncertainty regarding whether such 
information would be “of [the] character or kind farthest removed from the 
ordinary”149 would arise in cases where the information is either extreme or 
near extreme.  The disclose or abstain rule would thus be effectuated because 
issuing entities could face potential Section 11 liability.  Normal business 
fluctuations naturally would not fall under this category of information, as 
they inherently cannot be considered extreme or even approaching 
extreme.150 
B. Who Are Reasonable Investors, Actually? 
Another important policy implication to consider is the perspective of 
the reasonable investor.  Both the extreme departure and the total mix tests 
seek to determine whether an omission would be material to the reasonable 
investor.151  Therefore, the better test would be able to account for the actual 
ability of the reasonable investor to consider the information that he or she 
is presented with in the prospectus and registration statement and predict the 
company’s future performance.  This Part is meant to address the question 
posed by the Second Circuit in Stadnick regarding the implementation of the 
extreme departure test: namely, what is “the precise role of the familiar 
‘objectively reasonable investor’ in assessing whether a departure is 
extreme.”152 
In a perfect world, the total mix test would be sufficient in catering to 
the needs of the reasonable investor.153  But when one looks to the reality of 
who the actual investor is, it is quite evident that there exists a significant 
disparity between the reasonable investor recognized by the law and the 
average investor participating in today’s stock market.154  A 2012 SEC study 
 
 149  Id. 
 150  See, e.g., Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1211 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding 
that Digital Equipment Corporation’s third quarter results presented “more than a minor 
business fluctuation . . . indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would turn out 
to be an extreme departure from publicly known trends and uncertainties”). 
 151  See supra Part I. 
 152  Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 153  See generally Lin, supra note 5, at 467 (“In terms of cognition, the reasonable investor 
is generally understood to be the idealized, perfectly rational actor of neoclassical economics.  
The reasonable investor is presumed to operate rationally to maximize returns in the 
marketplace.  Prior to making investment decisions, the reasonable investor is capable of 
reading and comprehending all the noise and signals in the marketplace that encapsulate 
formal disclosures, economic data, market trends, senseless speculation, and irresponsible 
rumors.  As such, when given the requisite information, reasonable investors are able to 
properly price the risks and rewards of an investment.”).  
 154  See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science 
to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1047 n.151 (1989) (“[E]conomists 
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found that the average American investor did not possess basic financial 
literacy and thus did not have the ability or the necessary knowledge to 
safeguard him or herself from being a victim of securities fraud.155  Prime 
examples of the average investor’s lack of financial literacy and ability to 
safeguard against fraud are the 2008 financial crisis and the dot-com 
bubble.156  With the 2008 financial crisis, there is evidence that many of the 
defaulting borrowers who were issued subprime mortgages did not 
understand the borrowing terms and the complex payment structures 
attached to their mortgages and, in actuality, could not afford the 
incrementally increasing payments.157  The case of the dot-com bubble is 
even more concerning, where investors jumped at the opportunity to 
purchase securities even remotely concerning the Internet and failed to 
consider other, more relevant factors, such as stock valuation.158  In fact, 
research has shown that there are many other factors that determine whether 
a prospective investor will choose to invest in a company other than his or 
her rational evaluation of that company’s ability to perform.159  Tom C.W. 
Lin notes the following: 
Many investors, for instance, are motivated by irrelevant factors 
like sunlight, weather, and sleep when making investment 
decisions.  Irrational investors also chase fads and exhibit herd 
mentality with their investments.  Additionally, irrational 
investors frequently possess perilous amounts of optimism, 
confidence, and loss aversion that diminish their capacity to make 
the best investment decisions.160 
Accordingly, courts should not be as confident as they are that the reasonable 
investor is actually reasonable.  While there is a strong legal tradition in 
 
who assume that people are ‘rational’ decisionmakers have articulated highly sophisticated 
models that purport to make predictions of great exactitude.  In the real world, of course, 
people are not rational decisionmakers, and the economists’ models suffer accordingly.”). 
 155  Lin, supra note 5, at 469 (citing OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & U.S. SECURITIES & EXCH. 
COMMISSION, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012)). 
 156  See id. 
 157  Gerald H. Lander et al., Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue, 15 INT’L 
ADVANCES ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2009) (“Numerous borrowers say they didn’t understand the loan 
structure and the escalating payments; in many cases, they couldn’t afford them.”). 
 158  Lin, supra note 5, at 469; see also David Kleinbard, The $1.7 Trillion Dot.com Lesson, 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 9, 2000, 5:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2000/11/09/technology/overvie 
w/ (“The collapse of the Internet bubble, perhaps one of the largest financial fiascoes in U.S. 
history, came after a three-year period, starting in January 1997, when investors would buy 
almost anything even vaguely associated with the Internet, regardless of valuation.  Investors 
ignored huge current losses and were willing to pay 100 times expected earnings in fiscal 
2002.  They were goaded by bullish reports from sell-side securities analysts and market 
forecasts from IT research firms . . . .”). 
 159  Lin, supra note 5, at 470.   
 160  Id. 
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utilizing the reasonable person standard, there exists risk in relying on the 
reasonable investor standard in creating judicial tests in the financial context 
particularly due to the market consequences that potentially may occur and, 
historically, have regularly occurred. 
Applying the actual reasonable investor standard to facts like those in 
Shaw and Stadnick underscores the issues present in steadfastly applying the 
reasonable investor standard.  At the outset, it should be noted that the term 
“actual reasonable investor” refers to the typical investor who, according to 
Lin, lacks financial literacy, is vulnerable to trends, and often acts on impulse 
or other external motivators.161  As discussed above, Shaw presented 
investors with a tricky analytical situation in which predictions concerning 
the company’s profitability and future success could have gone either way,162 
and  Stadnick, similarly, presented investors with information that was 
difficult to digest and analyze.163  Although, in theory, the information was 
present for prospective investors to make an accurate prediction of Vivint 
Solar’s future success, an actual reasonable investor would not have been 
able to easily interpret the effects of its complex accounting methods 
combined with front-loaded losses.  Likewise, an investor theoretically could 
have predicted that Digital Equipment Corporation would, once again, 
experience widespread and fluctuating losses, but this would have required 
sophisticated financial knowledge and a diligent study of the company’s 
past-reported financial statements.  This evidences the fact that the total mix 
of information available to investors would necessarily be assessed 
differently depending on the investor’s level of financial sophistication.  An 
institutional investor would have been able to see from the total mix of 
information available that there was a real risk of loss in either of these 
circumstances.  An individual who trades from an online brokerage account, 
for example, likely would not be able to arrive at the same prediction, though, 
because he or she would lack the perspective to adequately analyze the total 
mix of information available to him or her.164 
 
 161  Id. at 471 (“[U]nlike the reasonable investor, who lives in a simple, perfectly efficient 
world populated only with other perfectly informed, rational characters, the irrational investor 
inhabits a complicated world populated with other flawed, complex characters—the real 
world.  Optimal investment decisions and sustained investment successes are much more 
difficult to model and predict in the real world.  As Isaac Newton noted after suffering large 
losses during the South Sea Bubble of 1720, ‘I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies 
but not the madness of people.’” (citation omitted)). 
 162  Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 163  Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 33–35 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 164  See Lin, supra note 5, at 484 (“A diverse population of investors necessarily means 
that investors having asymmetrical information, varying sophistication, and disparate 
resources exist in the market . . . .  After all, it is difficult to believe that investment banks and 
hedge funds, with armies of research analysts, sophisticated forecasting models, and high-
speed trading platforms, are investing on the same level as the average investor who simply 
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Assessing the materiality of an omission should account for the 
disparity of investors’ intelligence and sophistication along with the 
resources available at their disposal.  The total mix test does not recognize 
this disparity.165  Because the reasonable investor standard is calibrated more 
toward an institutional investor,166 this standard would basically render an 
omission material only if an institutional investor would have viewed the 
omitted information as altering the total mix of their forecasted conclusions 
concerning the company’s performance abilities.  The total mix of 
information that an actual reasonable investor would garner from that same 
information is lacking due to the inability of an actual reasonable investor to 
fully understand, comprehend, and analyze such information.167  
Accordingly, a higher standard must be utilized to account for this disparity.  
The extreme departure test would be capable of doing so, ensuring that both 
institutional and actual reasonable investors would have the information 
necessary to form a complete picture of the health and potential success of 
an issuer in more cases than would the total mix test.168 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the extreme departure test should be the 
standard for determining the materiality of an omission in the public offering 
context.  While the total mix test may be appropriate in determining the 
materiality of other omissions or information generally, the peculiarity of the 
public offering context warrants the imposition of a higher materiality 
standard.  Furthermore, the implementation of the extreme departure test 
would result in disclosure in more cases than the total mix test, thus 
establishing a quasi-disclose-or-abstain rule on issuing entities offering 
shares through a public offering.  It would also reduce the investing 
 
watches CNBC, reads The Wall Street Journal, and trades with his online brokerage 
account.”). 
 165  See generally id. at 467. 
 166  See generally id. 
 167  Lin cites multiple studies that reveal that actual reasonable investors are incapable of 
“beating the market” by conducting individual research and trading.  Id. at 486.  Those studies 
include the following: Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your 
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 
785–88, (2000); Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual 
Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594–95 (2004); Ronald C. Lease et al., The 
Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31 (1974); Don A. Moore 
et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 95, 110–12 (1999); and Felix Salmon, 
Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837, 837 (2004). 
 168  This Comment does not argue that a subjective investor test should overtake the 
objective reasonable investor test.  It does, however, argue that courts’ understanding of who 
constitutes a reasonable investor should change to better reflect the vast majority of 
investors—the actual reasonable investors.  See Lin, supra note 5, at 471. 
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advantage of institutional investors over individual investors—an advantage 
that is attributable to the disparity in financial literacy, sophistication, and 
resources between the two groups.  Additionally, it would work hand-in-
hand with the pull of the market in attempting to ensure that stock valuation 
best matches fundamental value. 
Like the total mix test, the extreme departure test still safeguards the 
issuing entity from the threat of overwhelming liability.  The extreme 
departure test would only mandate disclosure when the omitted information 
would cause an extreme or near extreme departure from a known trend or 
risk.  Although future case law would have to refine the terms of what would 
define an extreme departure, issuing entities still have clarity in their 
obligations.  What is clear is that events classified as extreme are those 
“exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected,”169 and, thus, events that are 
more akin to the ordinary, usual, or expected would not rise to the level of 
extreme.  Disclosure, then, would be necessary only in cases that depart from 
regular business fluctuations, yet would still be mandated more cases than 
under the total mix test.170 
As indicated above, however, courts would still need to determine the 
metrics for determining an extreme departure.171  Metrics for determining an 
extreme departure are very much dependent on the facts of each particular 
case.  What constitutes an extreme departure for one issuing entity may not 
be an extreme departure for another issuing entity.  Even in light of the fact-
sensitive inquiry that must take place in applying the extreme departure test 
and the uncertainty that this may present issuing entities, the extreme 
departure test is flexible enough to maintain equity and fairness. 
Not only will investors benefit from a higher materiality standard in the 
context of public offerings, but so too will the market.  Stock prices are often 
incongruent with their fundamental value because of one or more of the 
following reasons: “lack of information, misassessment of information, 
speculative trading, and liquidity crunches.”172  The first three of these 
reasons are implicated by the omissions of the sort in Shaw and Stadnick.  
Hence, a materiality standard that induces issuing entities to disclose more 
information would benefit the market by ensuring that stock prices are more 
 
 169  Extreme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extreme 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
 170  The total mix test would not warrant disclosure of an extreme departure from a known 
trend or risk if a reasonable investor could likely have predicted the possibility of that outcome 
actually occurring.  The extreme departure test would warrant disclosure even when the total 
mix of information could have led the reasonable investor to predict that outcome.   
 171  See Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017) (asking “which 
metrics courts should look to in assessing whether such a departure has occurred” in applying 
the extreme departure test). 
 172  Kahan, supra note 91, at 988. 
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accurate. 
The focus then shifts to enforcement.  The ability of courts, or even the 
SEC, to enforce such disclosure requirements is often doubted.173  While 
courts and the SEC may undoubtedly play a role in enforcement, it is the 
market itself that has the ability to force compliance with the disclosures 
required under the extreme departure test.174  And, indeed, the market has a 
reason to force compliance because of its inherent struggle to achieve 
equality.  Therefore, the extreme departure test is courts’ best attempt to 
implement a disclosure obligation that complements the market’s disclosure 
demands.  Together, the two may interact to decrease the disparity between 
an issuing entity’s stock valuation and that stock’s fundamental value. 
In a society still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, courts must 
take responsibility for strengthening the statutory safeguards in place so as 
to avoid the perils of the past.  What the market and investors need is 
transparency.  What issuing entities need is a stronger market with more 
investors.  Adopting the extreme departure test for omissions in the context 
of public offerings has the potential to benefit all parties with proper 
implementation.  The total mix of information points to the overwhelming 
benefit of the extreme departure test. 
 
 
 173  See Gulati, supra note 146, at 729 (“[C]ompanies and their lawyers will no doubt ask: 
(1) Does this new duty mean that when we do offerings we will have an affirmative duty to 
collect our intraquarterly information and examine it to see whether or not it is material? (2) 
What if we, for internal cost-related reasons, do not collect and evaluate information until the 
quarter is over? (3) Does this obligation apply only to end-of-quarter offerings? (4) Are we 
exempt if we time our offerings to be at the beginning of a quarter?”).  
 174  See id. at 690 (“Because the market itself disciplines firms, through the imposition of 
nonlegal sanctions such as reputational costs, the creation of legal sanctions is largely 
unnecessary to force appropriate disclosures and, in fact, is positively detrimental to a well-
functioning market—witness the phenomenon of frivolous ‘strike suits.’”). 
